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Humans are adept at uncovering abstract associations in the world around them, yet the
underlying mechanisms remain poorly understood. Intuitively, learning the higher-order
structure of statistical relationships should involve complex mental processes. Here we pro-
pose an alternative perspective: that higher-order associations instead arise from natural
errors in learning and memory. Combining ideas from information theory and reinforce-
ment learning, we derive a maximum entropy (or minimum complexity) model of people’s
internal representations of the transitions between stimuli. Importantly, our model (i) affords
a concise analytic form, (ii) qualitatively explains the effects of transition network structure
on human expectations, and (iii) quantitatively predicts human reaction times in probabilis-
tic sequential motor tasks. Together, these results suggest that mental errors influence our
abstract representations of the world in significant and predictable ways, with direct impli-
cations for the study and design of optimally learnable information sources.
2
Introduction
Our experience of the world is punctuated in time by discrete events, all connected by an archi-
tecture of hidden forces and causes. In order to form expectations about the future, one of the
brain’s primary functions is to infer the statistical structure underlying past experiences.1–3 In fact,
even within the first year of life, infants reliably detect the frequency with which one phoneme
follows another in spoken language.4 By the time we reach adulthood, uncovering statistical re-
lationships between items and events enables us to perform abstract reasoning,5 identify visual
patterns,6 produce language,7 develop social intuition,8, 9 and segment continuous streams of data
into self-similar parcels.10 Notably, each of these functions requires the brain to identify statistical
regularities across a range of scales. It has long been known, for instance, that people are sensi-
tive to differences in individual transition probabilities such as those between words or concepts;
intuitively, people are surprised when they witness a rare transition.4, 6 Additionally, mounting evi-
dence suggests that humans can also infer abstract (or higher-order) statistical structures, including
hierarchical patterns within sequences of stimuli,11 temporal regularities on both global and lo-
cal scales,12, 13 abstract concepts within webs of semantic relationships,14 and general features of
sparse data.15
To study this wide range of statistical structures in a unified framework, scientists have in-
creasingly employed the language of network science,16 wherein stimuli or states are conceptu-
alized as nodes in a graph with edges or connections representing possible transitions between
them. In this way, a sequence of stimuli often reflects a random walk along an underlying transi-
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tion network,17–19 and we can begin to ask which network features give rise to variations in human
learning and behavior. This perspective has been particularly useful, for example, in the study of
artificial grammars,20 wherein human subjects are tasked with inferring the grammar rules (i.e.,
the network of transitions between letters and words) underlying a fabricated language.21 Com-
plementary research in statistical learning has demonstrated that modules (i.e., communities of
densely-connected nodes) within transition networks are reflected in brain imaging data22 and give
rise to stark shifts in human reaction times.23 Together, these efforts have culminated in a general
realization that people’s internal representations of a transition structure are strongly influenced by
its higher-order organization, even after controlling for variations in the first-order statistics.24, 25
But how does the brain learn these abstract network features? Does the inference of higher-order
relationships require sophisticated hierarchical learning algorithms? Or instead, do natural errors
in cognition yield a “blurry” representation, making the coarse-grained architecture readily appar-
ent?
To answer these questions, here we propose a single driving hypothesis: that when building
models of the world, the brain is finely-tuned to maximize accuracy while simultaneously mini-
mizing computational complexity. Generally, this assumption stems from a rich history exploring
the trade-off between brain function and computational cost,26, 27 from sparse coding principles
at the neuronal level28 to the competition between information integration and segregation at the
whole-brain level29 to the notion of exploration versus exploitation30 and the speed-accuracy trade-
off31 at the behavioral level. To formalize our hypothesis, we employ the free energy principle,32
which has become increasingly utilized to investigate functional constraints in the brain.33, 34 De-
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spite this thorough treatment of the accuracy-complexity trade-off in neuroscience and psychology,
the prevailing intuition in statistical learning maintains that the brain is either optimized to perform
Bayesian inference,8, 14, 15 which is inherently error free, or hierarchical learning,11, 13, 18, 20 which
typically entails increased rather than decreased computational complexity. Here, we show that the
competition between mental errors and computational complexity leads to a maximum entropy (or
minimum complexity) model of people’s internal representations of events.32, 35 As we decrease the
complexity of our model, allowing mental errors to take effect, we find that higher-order features
of the transition network organically come into focus while the fine-scale structure fades away,
thus providing a concise mechanism explaining how people infer abstract statistical relationships.
To a broad audience, our model provides an accessible mapping from statistical structures to hu-
man behaviors, with particular relevance for the study and design of optimally learnable transition
networks – either between words in spoken and written language,20, 21, 35 notes in music,36 or even
concepts in classroom lectures.37
Network effects on human expectations
In the cognitive sciences, mounting evidence suggests that human expectations depend critically
on the higher-order features of transition networks.17, 18 Here, we make this notion concrete with
empirical evidence for higher-order network effects in a probabilistic sequential response task.24
Specifically, we presented human subjects with sequences of stimuli on a computer screen, each
stimulus depicting a row of five grey squares with one or two of the squares highlighted in red
(Fig. 17a). In response to each stimulus, subjects were asked to press one or two computer keys
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Fig. 1: Subjects respond to sequences of stimuli drawn as a random walk on an
underlying transition graph.
a, Example sequence of visual stimuli (left) representing a random walk on an underlying
transition network (right). b, For each stimulus, subjects are asked to respond by pressing
a combination of one or two buttons on a keyboard. c, Each of the 15 possible button com-
binations corresponds to a node in the transition network. We only consider networks with
nodes of uniform degree k = 4 and edges with uniform transition probability 0.25. d, Subjects
were asked to respond to sequences of 1500 such nodes drawn from two different transition
architectures: a modular graph (left) and a lattice graph (right). e, Average reaction times
across all subjects for the different button combinations, where the diagonal elements rep-
resent single-button presses and the off-diagonal elements represent two-button presses. f,
Average reaction times as a function of trial number, characterized by a steep drop-off in the
first 500 trials followed by a gradual decline in the remaining 1000 trials.
mirroring the highlighted squares (Fig. 17b). Each of the 15 different stimuli represented a node
in an underlying transition network, upon which a random walk stipulated the sequential order of
stimuli (Fig. 17a). Importantly, by measuring the speed with which a subject responded to each
stimulus, we were able to infer their expectations about the transition structure – a fast reaction
reflected a strongly-anticipated transition, while a slow reaction reflected a weakly-anticipated (or
surprising) transition.1, 2, 24, 38
6
While it has long been known that humans can detect differences in transition probabili-
ties – for instance, rare transitions lead to sharp increases in reaction times4, 6 – more recently it
has become clear that people’s expectations also reflect the higher-order architecture of transition
networks.22–24, 39 To clearly study these higher-order effects without the complicating influence of
edge weight variability, here we only consider transition graphs with a uniform transition prob-
ability of 0.25 on each edge, thereby requiring nodes to have uniform degree k = 4 (Fig. 17c).
Specifically, we consider two different graph topologies: a modular graph with three communi-
ties of five densely-connected nodes and a lattice graph representing a 3 × 5 grid with periodic
boundary conditions (Fig. 17d). Since both graphs have the same local structure (i.e., uniform
node degree and edge weight), we stress that any systematic difference in reaction times between
different parts of a graph, or between the two graphs themselves, must stem from expectations
about their higher-order modular or lattice structure.
Regressing out the dependence of reaction times on the different button combinations (Fig.
17e) as well as the natural quickening of reactions with time40 (Fig. 17f; see Methods), we identify
two effects of higher-order network structure on subjects’ reactions. First, in the modular graph
we find that reactions corresponding to within-cluster transitions are 50 ms faster than reactions
to between-cluster transitions (p < 0.001; Supplementary Tab. 1), an effect known as the cross-
cluster surprisal24, 39 (Fig. 2a). Second, across all transitions within each network, we find that
reactions in the modular graph are 31 ms faster than those in the lattice graph (p < 0.001; Supple-
mentary Tab. 2), a phenomenon that we coin the modular-lattice effect (Fig. 2b). To ensure that
these results are not simply driven by recency effects, we performed a separate experiment with
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short sequences of stimuli drawn according to Hamiltonian walks interspersed within the stan-
dard sequences of random walks.22 We find that the cross-cluster surprisal arises even within these
Hamiltonian walks, thereby confirming that higher-order network effects cannot be explained by
recency alone (Supplementary Tabs. 3 and 4). In addition to these effects on reaction times, we also
find that the probability of an erroneous response (i.e., a person responding with an incorrect key
combination) increases for between-cluster transitions relative to within-cluster transitions (Sup-
plementary Tab. 5). Together, these results indicate that people’s internal anticipations of events
depend critically on the higher-order architecture of a transition network. But how do people infer
abstract features like community structure from sequences of stimuli? In what follows, we leverage
ideas from information theory and reinforcement learning to argue that one answer to this question
lies in understanding the subtle role of mental errors.
Network effects reveal errors in graph learning
Thus far, we have implicitly assumed, as is common, that humans maintain an internal represen-
tation Aˆ of the transition structure, where Aˆij represents the expected probability of transitioning
from node i to node j. Given a running tally nij of the number of times each transition has oc-
curred, one might naı¨vely expect that the human brain is optimized to learn the true transition
structure as accurately as possible.41, 42 This common hypothesis is represented by the maximum
likelihood estimate,43 taking the simple form
AˆMLEij =
nij∑
k nik
. (1)
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Fig. 2: The effects of higher-order network structure on human reaction times.
a, Cross-cluster surprisal effect in the modular graph, defined by an average increase in reac-
tion times for between-cluster transitions (right) relative to within-cluster transitions (left). For
results of statistical testing, see Supplementary Tab. 1. b, Modular-lattice effect, characterized
by an overall increase in reaction times in the lattice graph (right) relative to the modular graph
(left). For results of statistical testing, see Supplementary Tab. 2.
To see that human behavior does not reflect maximum likelihood estimation, we note simply that
Eq. (1) provides an unbiased estimate of the transition structure;43 that is, the estimated edge
weights in AˆMLE are evenly distributed about their true value 0.25, independent of the higher-
order transition structure. Thus, the fact that people’s reaction times depend systematically on
abstract features of the network marks a clear deviation from maximum likelihood estimation. To
understand how higher-order network structure impacts people’s internal representations, we must
delve deeper into the learning process itself.
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Consider a sequence of nodes (x1, x2, . . .), where xt ∈ {1, . . . , N} represents the node ob-
served at time t and N is the size of the network (here N = 15 for all graphs). To update the
maximum likelihood estimate of the transition structure at time t + 1, one increments the counts
nij using the following recursive rule,
nij(t+ 1) = nij(t) + [i = xt] [j = xt+1] , (2)
where the Iverson bracket [·] = 1 if its argument is true and equals 0 otherwise. Importantly, we
note that at each time t + 1, a person must recall the previous node that occurred at time t; in
other words, they must associate a cause xt to each effect xt+1 that they observe. While maximum
likelihood estimation requires perfect recollection of the previous node at each step, human errors
in perception and recall are inevitable.44–46 A more plausible scenario is that, when attempting to
recall the node at time t, a person instead remembers the node at time t−∆t with some decreasing
probability P (∆t), where ∆t ≥ 0. This memory distribution, in turn, generates an internal belief
about which node occurred at time t,
Bt(i) =
t−1∑
∆t=0
P (∆t) [i = xt−∆t] . (3)
Updating Eq. (2) accordingly, we arrive at a new learning rule that accounts for natural errors in
perception and recall,
n˜ij(t+ 1) = n˜ij(t) +Bt(i) [j = xt+1] . (4)
Using this revised counting rule, we can begin to form more realistic predictions about people’s
internal estimates of the transition structure, Aˆij = n˜ij/
∑
k n˜ik.
We pause to emphasize that P (∆t) does not represent the forgetting of past stimuli alto-
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gether; instead, it reflects the local shuffling of stimuli in time. In fact, if one were to simply forget
past stimuli at some fixed rate – a process recently shown to play a vital role in other cognitive
tasks47 – this would merely introduce white noise into the maximum likelihood estimate AˆMLE (see
Supplementary Information). By contrast, we will see that by shuffling the order of stimuli in time,
people are able to gather information about the higher-order structure of the underlying transitions.
Choosing a memory distribution: The free energy principle
In order to make predictions about people’s expectations, we must choose a particular mathemati-
cal form for the memory distribution P (∆t). To do so, we begin with a single driving hypothesis:
that the brain is finely-tuned to (i) minimize errors and (ii) minimize computational complex-
ity. Formally, we define the error of a recalled stimulus to be its distance in time from the de-
sired stimulus (i.e., ∆t), such that the average error of a candidate distribution Q(∆t) is given by
E(Q) =
∑
∆tQ(∆t)∆t. By contrast, it might seem difficult to formalize the computational com-
plexity associated with storing and recalling events from a distribution Q. Intuitively, we would
like the complexity ofQ to increase with increasing certainty, and we would also like the complex-
ity of two independent memory distributions to be additive. As famously shown by Shannon, these
two criteria are sufficient to derive a quantitative definition of complexity35 – namely, the negative
entropy −S(Q) = ∑∆tQ(∆t) logQ(∆t). All together, the total cost of a distribution Q is its free
energy F (Q) = βE(Q) − S(Q), where β is the inverse temperature parameter, which quantifies
the relative value that the brain places on accuracy versus computational complexity.34 In this way,
our simple assumption about resource constraints in the brain necessarily leads to a particular form
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for P : It must be the distribution that minimizes F (Q), namely the Boltzmann distribution32
P (∆t) =
1
Z
e−β∆t, (5)
where Z is the normalizing constant or partition function (see Methods). Interestingly, free en-
ergy arguments similar to the one presented here have become increasingly utilized as a way to
formalize constraints on cognitive functions,33, 34 with applications from bounded-rational decision
making34 to human action, perception, and learning under temporal or computational limitations.48–51
Taken together, Eqs. (3-5) define our maximum entropy model of people’s internal transition esti-
mates Aˆ.
To gain an intuition for the model, we consider the infinite-time limit, such that the transi-
tion estimates become independent of the particular random walk chosen for analysis. Given a
transition matrix A, one can show that the asymptotic estimates in our model are equivalent to an
average over walks of various lengths, Aˆ =
∑
∆t P (∆t)A
∆t+1, which, in turn, can be fashioned
into the following analytic expression,
Aˆ = (1− e−β)A(I − e−βA)−1, (6)
where I is the identity matrix (see Methods). The model contains a single free parameter β, which
represents the precision of a person’s mental representation. In the limit β →∞ (no mental errors),
our model becomes equivalent to maximum likelihood estimation (Fig. 3a), and the asymptotic es-
timates Aˆ converge to the true transition structureA (Fig 3b), as expected.52 Conversely, in the limit
β → 0 (overwhelming mental errors), the memory distribution P (∆t) becomes uniform across all
past nodes (Fig. 3a), and the mental representation Aˆ loses all resemblance to the true structure A
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Fig. 3: A maximum entropy model of transition probability estimates in humans.
a, Illustration of the maximum entropy distribution P (∆t) representing the probability of re-
calling a stimulus ∆t time steps from the target stimulus (dashed line). In the limit β → 0,
the distribution becomes uniform over all past stimuli (left). In the opposite limit β → ∞, the
distribution becomes a delta function on the desired stimuli (right). For intermediate amounts
of noise, the distribution drops off monotonically (center). b, Resulting internal estimates Aˆ of
the transition structure. For β → 0, the estimates become all-to-all, losing any resemblance
to the true structure (left), while for β → ∞, the transition estimates become exact (right).
At intermediate precision, the higher-order community structure organically comes into focus
(center). c-d, Predictions of the cross-cluster surprisal effect (panel c) and the modular-lattice
effect (panel d) as functions of the inverse temperature β.
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(Fig. 3b). Remarkably, however, for intermediate values of β, higher-order features of the tran-
sition network, such as communities of densely-connected nodes, come into sharper focus, while
some of the fine-scale features, like the edges between communities, fade away (Fig. 3b). In fact,
applying Eq. (6) to the modular graph, we find that the average expected probability of within-
community transitions reaches over 1.6 times the estimated probability of between-community
transitions (Fig. 3c), thus offering an explanation for the cross-cluster surprisal effect.24, 39 Fur-
thermore, we find that the average estimated transition probabilities in the modular graph reach
over 1.4 times the estimated probabilities in the lattice graph (Fig. 3d), thereby predicting the
modular-lattice effect. In addition to these higher-order effects, we find that the model also ex-
plains previously reported variations in human expectations at the level of individual nodes4, 6, 24
(Supplementary Fig. 1). Together, these results demonstrate that the maximum entropy model
predicts the qualitative effects of network structure on human reaction times. But can we use the
same ideas to quantitatively predict the behavior of particular individuals?
Predicting the behavior of individual humans
In order to model the behavior of particular individuals, we must relate the transition estimates in
Eqs. (3-5) to predictions about people’s reaction times. Given a sequence of nodes x1, . . . , xt−1, we
note that the reaction to the next node xt is determined by the expected probability of transitioning
from xt−1 to xt calculated at time t − 1, which we denote by a(t) = Aˆxt−1,xt(t − 1). From this
internal anticipation a(t), the simplest possible prediction rˆ(t) for a person’s reaction time is given
by the linear relationship53 rˆ(t) = r0 +r1a(t), where the intercept r0 represents a person’s reaction
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time with zero anticipation and the slope r1 quantifies the strength of the relationship between a
person’s reactions and the internal representation in our model.54 To estimate the parameters β, r0,
and r1 that best describe a given individual, we minimize the RMS prediction error with respect
to their observed reaction times after regressing out their button combination and trial number
dependencies (Figs. 17e and 17f; see Methods). The distributions of the estimated parameters
are shown in Fig. 4a. Among the 358 completed sequences in the modular and lattice graphs
(across 214 subjects; see Methods), 44 were best described as performing maximum likelihood
estimation (β →∞) and 71 seemed to lack any notion of the transition structure whatsoever (β →
0), while among the remaining 243 sequences, the average inverse temperature was β = 0.31.
Interestingly, this value of β roughly corresponds to that for which our model predicts the strongest
network effects (Figs. 3c and 3d). In the following section, we will compare this value of β
estimated indirectly from people’s reaction times with direct measurements of β in an independent
experiment assessing human memory performance.
In addition to measuring β, we also wish to determine whether our model accurately de-
scribes individual behavior. Toward this end, we first note that the average slope r1 is large
(r1 = −1127 ms), suggesting that the transition estimates in our model a(t) are strongly predictive
of human reaction times, and negative, confirming the intuition that increased anticipation yields
decreased reaction times (Fig. 4b). To quantitatively examine the accuracy of our framework, we
compare our model against a hierarchy of competing models rˆ(`), which represent the hypothesis
that humans learn explicit representations of the higher-order transition structure – an assumption
that requires increased rather than decreased computational complexity relative to maximum like-
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Fig. 4: Predicting reaction times for individual subjects.
a, Distributions of the estimated parameters for our maximum entropy model (i.e., rˆ(t) =
r0 + r1a(t)) across all 358 completed sequences. For the inverse temperature β (left), 44
subjects were best described as performing maximum likelihood estimation (β → ∞), 71
lacked any notion of the transition structure (β → 0), and the remaining 243 subjects had
an average value of β = 0.31. The intercept r0 is positive, with an average value of 964 ms
(center), while the slope r1 is strongly negative with an average value of −1127 ms (right).
b, Predicted reaction time plotted as a function of a subject’s internal anticipation. Grey lines
indicate 20 randomly-selected subjects, and the red line shows the average prediction over
all subjects. c, Average linear parameters for the fourth-order competing model. Besides
the intercept c(4)0 , all coefficients are negative with increasingly higher-order transitions having
progressively less predictive power. d, Comparing the performance of our maximum entropy
model with the hierarchy of competing models up to fourth-order. (Top) RMS error of our model
averaged over subjects (dashed line) compared to the average RMS errors of the competing
models (solid line); our model maintains higher accuracy than the competing hierarchy up to
the third-order model. (Bottom) Average Bayesian information criterion (BIC) of the maximum
entropy model (dashed line) compared to the average BIC of the competing models (solid line);
our model provides the best description of the data across all models considered.
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lihood estimation. In particular, we denote the `th-order transition matrix by Aˆ(`)ij = n
(`)
ij /
∑
k n
(`)
ik ,
where n(`)ij counts the number of observed transitions from node i to node j in ` steps. We then
define a hierarchy of models that take into account increasingly higher-order transition structures,
such that the `th-order model contains perfect information about transitions up to length `:
rˆ(0)(t) = c
(0)
0 ,
rˆ(1)(t) = c
(1)
0 + c
(1)
1 a
(1)(t),
...
rˆ(`)(t) = c
(`)
0 +
∑`
k=1
c
(`)
k a
(k)(t), (7)
where a(k)(t) = Aˆ(k)xt−1,xt(t− 1). Generally, each model rˆ(`) contains `+ 1 parameters c(`)0 , . . . , c(`)` ,
where c(`)k quantifies the predictive power of the k
th-order transition structure. Intuitively, for each
model rˆ(`), we expect c(`)1 , c
(`)
2 , . . . to be negative, reflecting a decrease in reaction times due to
increased anticipation, and decreasing in magnitude, reflecting the intuition that higher-order tran-
sition structures should be progressively less predictive of people’s reaction times. Indeed, consid-
ering the fourth-order model rˆ(4) as an example, we find that progressively higher-order transition
structures play decreasingly significant roles in shaping human reactions (Fig. 4c). However, even
the largest coefficient in the fourth-order model (c(4)1 = −165 ms) is nearly an order of magnitude
smaller than the slope in our model (r1 = −1127 ms), indicating that the representation Aˆ in our
model is much more strongly predictive of people’s reaction times than any of the explicit repre-
sentations Aˆ(1), Aˆ(2), . . . in the competing models. In fact, our maximum entropy model achieves
higher accuracy than the first three orders of the competing model hierarchy (Fig. 4d) – this is
despite the fact that the third-order model even contains one more parameter. To account for the
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increasing number of parameters in the competing model hierarchy, we additionally compare the
average Bayesian information criterion (BIC) of our model with the average BIC of the competing
models, finding that the maximum entropy model provides the best description of the data across
all models considered. Taken together, these results indicate that the free energy hypothesis, and
the resulting maximum entropy model, are consistently more effective at describing human reac-
tions than the hypothesis that people learn explicit representations of the higher-order transition
structure.
Directly probing the memory distribution
Throughout our discussion, we have argued that errors in memory shape human representations in
predictable ways, a perspective that has received increasing attention in recent years.47, 55, 56 While
we have seen that this framework explains specific aspects of human behavior, we also note that
there exist alternative perspectives that could be used to generate similar predictions. For example,
one could imagine a Bayesian learner who assumes that the structure of the sequence is non-
Markovian and therefore “integrates” the transition structure over time, even without sustaining
errors in memory or learning. We arrive at a complementary viewpoint by noting that Eq. (6)
resembles the successor representation in reinforcement learning,57, 58 which assumes that, rather
than shuffling the order of past stimuli, humans are instead planning their responses multiple steps
in advance (see Supplementary Information for an extended discussion). In order to distinguish
our framework from these alternatives, here we provide direct evidence for precisely the types of
mental errors that our model predicts.
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In the construction and testing of our model, we have developed a number of predictions
concerning the shape of the memory distribution P (∆t), which, to recall, represents the probabil-
ity of remembering the stimulus at time t − ∆t instead of the target stimulus at time t. We first
assumed, as one would intuitively expect, that P (∆t) decreases monotonically in ∆t. Second, in
order to make quantitative predictions, we employed the free energy principle, leading to the spe-
cific prediction that P drops off exponentially quickly with ∆t (Eq. (5)). Finally, when describing
the reaction times of individual subjects, we estimated an average value for the inverse temperature
β of 0.31. To test these three predictions directly, we conducted a standard n-back memory ex-
periment. Specifically, we presented subjects with sequences of letters on a screen, and they were
asked to respond to each letter indicating whether or not it was the same as the letter that occurred
n steps previously; for each subject, this process was repeated for the three conditions n = 1, 2,
and 3. To measure the memory distribution P (∆t), we considered all trials on which a subject
responded positively that the current stimulus matched the target. For each such trial, we looked
back to the last time that the subject did in fact observe the current stimulus and we recorded the
distance (in trials) between this observation and the target (Fig. 5a). In this way, we were able to
treat each positive response as a sample of ∆t from the memory distribution P (∆t).
The measurements of P for the 1-, 2-, and 3-back tasks are shown in Figure 5b, and the
combined measurement of P across all conditions is shown in Figure 5c. Notably, the distribu-
tions decrease monotonically and maintain consistent exponential forms, even out to ∆t = 10
trials from the target stimulus, thereby providing direct evidence for the Boltzmann distribution
(Eq. (5)) and the free energy principle more generally. Moreover, fitting an exponential curve
19
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Fig. 5: Measuring the memory distribution in an n-back experiment.
a, Example of the 2-back memory task. Subjects view a sequence of stimuli (letters) and
respond to each stimulus indicating whether it matches the target stimulus from two trials
before. For each positive response that the current stimulus matches the target, we measure
∆t by calculating the number of trials between the last instance of the current stimulus and the
target. b, Histograms of ∆t (i.e., measurements of the memory distribution P (∆t)) across all
subjects in the 1-, 2-, and 3-back tasks. Dashed lines indicate exponential fits to the observed
distributions. The inverse temperature β is estimated for each task to be the negative slope of
the exponential fit. c, Memory distribution aggregated across the three n-back tasks. Dashed
line indicates an exponential fit. We report a combined estimate of the inverse temperature
β = 0.32 ± 0.01, where the standard deviation is estimated from 1,000 bootstrap samples of
the combined data.
to each distribution, we can directly estimate the inverse temperature β. Remarkably, the value
β = 0.32± 0.1 estimated from the combined distribution (Fig. 5c) matches (within errors) the av-
erage value β = 0.31 estimated from people’s reaction times in the serial response task (Fig. 4a).
To further strengthen the link between mental errors and people’s internal representations, we then
asked the subjects to perform the original serial response task (Fig. 17), and for each subject, we
estimated β using the two methods described above: First, we directly measured β by calculating
an exponential fit to their individual memory distribution, and second, we indirectly estimated β
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based on their reactions in the serial response task. Comparing these two estimates across subjects,
we find that they are significantly related with Spearman correlation rs = 0.28 (p = 0.047; see
Methods). When viewed in concert, these results demonstrate not only the existence of the partic-
ular form of mental errors predicted by our model – down to the specific value of β – but also the
relationship between these mental errors and people’s internal estimates of the transition structure.
Learned network structure guides reactions to novel transitions
Given a model that accurately describes human reactions to sequences of stimuli, it is ultimately
interesting to make new predictions about human behavior. Thus far, in keeping with the majority
of existing research,4, 6, 22–24, 39 we have focused exclusively on static transition graphs, wherein the
probability Aij of transitioning from state i to state j remains constant over time. However, the
statistical structures governing human life are continually shifting,59, 60 and people are often forced
to respond to rare or novel transitions.61, 62 Here we show that, when confronted with a novel
transition – or a violation to the preexisting transition network – not only are people surprised, but
the magnitude of their surprise depends critically on the topological length of the novel transition
in the previously learned network. This result reveals that people implicitly learn the topological
distances between all nodes in the transition graph, not just those pairs for which a transition has
already been observed.
To easily interpret the effects of topological distance on human reactions, we consider a ring
graph where each node is connected to its nearest and next-nearest neighbors (Fig. 6a). We asked
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Fig. 6: Network violations yield surprise that grows with topological distance.
a, Ring graph consisting of 15 nodes, where each node is connected to its nearest neighbors
and next-nearest neighbors on the ring. Starting from the boxed node, a sequence can un-
dergo a standard transition (green), a short violation of the transition structure (blue), or a long
violation (red). b, Our model predicts that subjects’ anticipations of both short (blue) and long
(red) violations should be weaker than their anticipations of standard transitions (left). Fur-
thermore, we predict that subjects’ anticipations of violations should decrease with increasing
topological distance (right). c, Average effects of network violations across 78 subjects, esti-
mated using a mixed effects model, with error bars indicating one standard deviation from the
mean. We find that all network violations yield increased reaction times relative to standard
transitions, with topologically distant violations inducing slower reactions than short violations,
thus confirming the predictions of our model.
subjects to respond to sequences of 1500 nodes drawn as random walks on the ring graph, but
with 50 violations randomly interspersed (see Methods). These violations were divided into two
categories: short violations of topological distance two and long violations of topological distances
three and four (Fig. 6a). Using maximum likelihood estimation (Eq. (1)) as a guide, one would
naı¨vely expect people to be equally surprised by all violations – indeed, each violation has never
been seen before. In contrast to this intuition, our model predicts that a person’s surprise at the
observation of a novel transition should depend crucially on that transition’s topological distance
in the underlying graph, with topologically longer violations inducing increased surprise over short
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violations (Fig. 6b). In the data, we find that all violations give rise to sharp increases in reaction
times relative to standard transitions (Fig. 6c; Supplementary Tab. 7), indicating that people are in
fact learning the underlying transition structure. More importantly, we find that reaction times for
long violations are 28 ms longer on average than those for short violations (p = 0.011; Fig. 6c;
Supplementary Tab. 8), even after accounting for recency effects (see Methods).63 These results
suggest that mental errors, while forcing human expectations to systematically deviate from reality,
provide people with an implicit understanding of the topological scales in a transition network.59–62
Conclusions and outlook
Daily life is filled with sequences of items that obey an underlying network architecture, from
networks of word and note transitions in natural language and music to networks of abstract rela-
tionships in classroom lectures and literature.5–10 How humans infer these complex structures from
examples and how they represent the networks internally are questions of fundamental and general
interest.11–15 Recent experiments in statistical learning have established that human representations
depend critically on the higher-order organization of probabilistic transitions, yet the underlying
mechanisms remain poorly understood.22–25 Here, we show that these network effects can be under-
stood as stemming from mental errors in people’s estimates of the transition structure. Combining
ideas from information theory and reinforcement learning, we propose a new model of human
expectations based on the hypothesis that the brain is tuned to simultaneously minimize both er-
rors and computational complexity.26–31, 34, 48–51 This competition between accuracy anCohen-01d
efficiency yields a noisy internal representation of the transitions between states, which, in turn,
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explains with notable accuracy an array of higher-order network phenomena observed in human
experiments.22–25 Importantly, our model admits a concise analytic form that aids intuition (Eq.
(6)) and, by estimating the inverse temperature β that best describes a particular individual, can be
used to predict human behavior on a person-by-person basis.
Our work directly inspires new research directions, particularly with regard to the study
and design of optimally learnable network structures. Given the notion that densely connected
communities help to mitigate the effects of mental errors on people’s internal representations, we
anticipate that networks with high “learnability” will possess a hierarchical community structure.64
Interestingly, such hierarchical organization has already been observed in a diverse range of real
world structures, from knowledge and language networks65 to social networks and the World Wide
Web.66 Could it be that these networks have evolved so as to facilitate accurate representations in
the minds of the humans observing and building them? Questions such as this demonstrate the im-
portance of having simple predictive models of human representations and point to the promising
future of this research endeavor.
Methods
Derivation of the maximum entropy model and the infinite-sequence limit. Here we provide a more thorough
derivation of our maximum entropy model of human expectations, with the goal of fostering intuition. Given a
matrix of erroneous transition counts n˜ij , our estimate of the transition structure is given by Aˆij = n˜ij/
∑
k n˜ik.
When observing a sequence of nodes x1, x2, . . ., in order to construct the counts n˜ij , we assume that humans use
the following recursive rule: n˜ij(t + 1) = n˜ij(t) + Bt(i) [j = xt+1], where Bt(i) denotes the belief, or per-
ceived probability, that node i occurred at the previous time t. This belief, in turn, can be written in terms of the
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probability P (∆t) of accidentally recalling the node that occurred ∆t time steps from the desired node at time t:
Bt(i) =
∑t−1
∆t=0 P (∆t) [i = xt−∆t].
In order to make quantitative predictions about people’s estimates of a transition structure, we must choose a
mathematical form for P (∆t). To do so, we leverage the free energy principle34: When building mental models, the
brain is finely-tuned to simultaneously minimize errors and computational complexity. The average error associated
with a candidate distribution Q(∆t) is assumed to be the average distance in time of the recalled node from the target
node, denoted E(Q) =
∑
∆tQ(∆t)∆t. Furthermore, Shannon famously proved that the only suitable choice for the
computational cost of a candidate distribution is its negative entropy,35 denoted −S(Q) = ∑∆tQ(∆t) logQ(∆t).
Taken together, the total cost associated with a distributionQ(∆t) is given by the free energy F (Q) = βE(Q)−S(Q),
where β, referred to as the inverse temperature, parameterizes the relative importance of minimizing errors versus
computational costs. By minimizing F with respect to Q, we arrive at the Boltzmann distribution P (∆t) = e−β∆t/Z,
where Z is the normalizing partition function.32 We emphasize that this mathematical form for P (∆t) followed
necessarily from our free energy assumption about the functionality of the brain.
To gain an analytic intuition for the model without referring to a particular random walk, we consider the limit
of an infinitely long sequence of nodes. To begin, we consider a sequence x1, . . . , xT of length T . At the end of this
sequence, the counting matrix takes the form
n˜ij(T ) =
T−1∑
t=1
Bt(i) [j = xt+1]
=
T−1∑
t=1
(
t−1∑
∆t=0
P (∆t) [i = xt−∆t]
)
[j = xt+1] . (8)
Dividing both sides by T , the right-hand side becomes a time average, which by the ergodic theorem converges to an
expectation over the transition structure in the limit T →∞,
lim
T→∞
n˜ij(T )
T
=
∞∑
∆t=0
P (∆t) 〈[i = xt−∆t] [j = xt+1]〉A , (9)
where 〈·〉A denotes an expectation over random walks in A. We note that the expectation of an identity function is
simply a probability, such that 〈[i = xt−∆t] [j = xt+1]〉A = pi
(
A∆t+1
)
ij
, where pi is the long-run probability of
node i appearing in the sequence and
(
A∆t+1
)
ij
is the probability of randomly walking from node i to node j in
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∆t+ 1 steps. Putting these pieces together, we find that the expectation Aˆ converges to a concise mathematical form,
lim
T→∞
Aˆij(T ) = lim
T→∞
n˜ij(T )∑
k n˜ik(T )
=
pi
∑∞
∆t=0 P (∆t)
(
A∆t+1
)
ij
pi
=
∞∑
∆t=0
P (∆t)
(
A∆t+1
)
ij
. (10)
Thus far, we have not appealed to our maximum entropy form for P (∆t). It turns out that doing so allows us to write
down an analytic expression for the long-time expectations Aˆ simply in terms of the transition structure A and the
inverse temperature β. Noting that Z =
∑∞
∆t=0 e
−β∆t = 1/(1− e−β) and∑∞∆t=0 (e−βA)∆t = (I − e−βA)−1, we
have
Aˆ =
∞∑
∆t=0
P (∆t)A∆t+1
=
1
Z
A
∞∑
∆t=0
(
e−βA
)∆t
=
(
1− e−β)A (I − e−βA)−1 . (11)
This surprisingly simple formula for the representation Aˆ is the basis for all of our analytic predictions (Figs. 3c, 3d,
and 6b) and is closely related to notions of communicability in complex network theory.67, 68
Estimating model parameters and making quantitative predictions. Given an observed sequence of nodes x1, . . . , xt−1,
and given an inverse temperature β, our model predicts the anticipation, or expectation, of the subsequent node xt to
be a(t) = Aˆxt−1,xt(t − 1). In order to quantitatively describe the reactions of an individual subject, we must re-
late the expectations a(t) to predictions about a person’s reaction times rˆ(t) and then calculate the model parameters
that best fit the reactions of an individual subject. The simplest possible prediction is given by the linear relation
rˆ(t) = r0 + r1a(t), where the intercept r0 represents a person’s reaction time with zero anticipation and the slope r1
quantifies the strength with which a person’s reaction times depend on their internal expectations.
In total, our predictions rˆ(t) contain three parameters (β, r0, and r1), which must be estimated from the data
for each subject. Before estimating these parameters, however, we first regress out the dependencies of each sub-
ject’s reaction times on the button combinations and trial number using a mixed effects model of the form ‘RT ∼
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log(Trial) ∗ Stage + Target + (1 + log(Trial) ∗ Stage | ID)’. Then, to estimate the model parameters that best
describe an individual’s reactions, we minimize the RMS prediction error with respect to each subject’s observed re-
action times, RMSE =
√∑
t(r(t)− rˆ(t))2. We note that, given a choice for the inverse temperature β, the linear
parameters r0 and r1 can be calculated analytically using standard linear regression techniques. Thus, the problem
of estimating the model parameters can be restated as a one-dimensional minimization problem; that is, minimizing
RMSE with respect to the inverse temperature β. To find the global minimum, we began by calculating RMSE along
200 logarithmically-spaced values for β between 10−4 and 10. Then, starting at the minimum value of this search, we
performed gradient descent until the gradient fell below an absolute value of 10−6. For a derivation of the gradient of
the RMSE with respect to the inverse temperature β, we point the reader to the Supplemental Information. Finally,
in addition to the gradient descent procedure described above, for each subject we also manually checked the RMSE
associated with the two limits β → 0 and β → ∞. The resulting model parameters for all subjects that responded to
the modular or lattice graphs are shown in Fig. 4a.
Experimental setup for serial response tasks. Subjects performed a self-paced serial reaction time task using a
computer screen and keyboard. Each stimulus was presented as a horizontal row of five grey squares; all five squares
were shown at all times. The squares corresponded spatially with the keys ‘Space’, ‘H’, ‘J’, ‘K’, and ‘L’, with the left
square representing ‘Space’ and the right square representing ‘L’ (Fig. 17b). To indicate a target key or pair of keys
for the subject to press, the corresponding squares would become outlined in red (Fig. 17a). When subjects pressed
the correct key combination, the squares on the screen would immediately display the next target. If an incorrect key
or pair of keys was pressed, the message ‘Error!’ was displayed on the screen below the stimuli and remained until
the subject pressed the correct key(s). The order in which stimuli were presented to each subject was prescribed by a
random walk on a graph of N = 15 nodes. For each subject, one of the 15 key combinations was randomly assigned
to each node in the graph (Fig. 17a). Across all graphs, each node was connected to four other nodes with a uniform
0.25 transition probability. Importantly, given the uniform edge weights and homogeneous node degrees (k = 4), the
only differences between the transition graphs lay in their higher-order structure.
In the first experiment, we considered two different graph topologies: a modular graph with three communities
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of five densely-connected nodes and a lattice graph representing a 3× 5 grid with periodic boundary conditions (Fig.
17c). The purpose of this experiment was to demonstrate the systematic dependencies of human reaction times on
higher-order network structure, following similar results reported in recent literature.24, 39 In particular, we demon-
strate two higher-order network effects: In the cross-cluster surprisal effect, average reaction times for within-cluster
transitions in the modular graph are significantly faster than reaction times for between-cluster transitions (Fig. 2a);
and in the modular-lattice effect, average reaction times in the modular graph are significantly faster than reaction
times in the lattice graph (Fig. 2b).
In the second experiment, we considered a ring graph where each node was connected to its nearest and next-
nearest neighbors in the ring (Fig. 6a). In order to study the dependence of human expectations on violations to the
network structure, the first 500 trials for each subject constituted a standard random walk, allowing each subject time
to develop expectations about the underlying transition structure. Across the final 1000 trials, we randomly distributed
50 network violations: 20 short violations of topological distance two and 30 long violations, 20 of topological dis-
tance three and 10 of topological distance four (Fig. 6a). As predicted by our model, we found a novel violations
effect, wherein violations of longer topological distance give rise to larger increases in reaction times than short, local
violations (Figs. 6b and 6c).
Data analysis for serial response tasks. To make inferences about subjects’ internal expectations based on their
reaction times, we used more stringent filtering techniques than previous experiments when pre-processing the data.24
Across both experiments, we first excluded from analysis the first 500 trials, in which subjects’ reaction times varied
wildly (Fig. 17e), focusing instead on the final 1000 trials, at which point subjects had already developed internal
expectations about the transition structures. We then excluded all trials in which subjects responded incorrectly.
Finally, we excluded reaction times that were implausible, either three standard deviations from a subjects’ mean
reaction time or below 100 ms. Furthermore, when measuring the network effects in both experiments, we also
excluded reaction times over 3500 ms for implausibility (Figs. 2 and 6). When learning the parameters of our model
and measuring model performance in the first experiment (Fig. 4), to avoid large fluctuations in the results based
on outlier reactions, we were even more stringent, excluding all reaction times over 2000 ms. Taken together, when
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measuring the cross-cluster surprisal and modular-lattice effects (Fig. 2), we used an average of 931 trials per subject;
when learning and evaluating our model (Fig. 4), we used an average of 911 trials per subject; and when measuring
the violation effects (Fig. 6), we used an average of 917 trials per subject. To ensure that our results are robust to
particular choices in the data processing, we additionally studied all 1500 trials for each subject rather than just the
final 1000, confirming that both the cross-cluster surprisal and modular-lattice effects remain significant across all
trials (Supplementary Tabs. 9 and 10).
Measurement of higher-order network effects using mixed effects models. In order to extract the effects of higher-
order network structure on subjects’ reaction times, we used linear mixed effects models, which have become promi-
nent in human research where many measurements are made for each subject.40, 69 Put simply, mixed effects models
generalize standard linear regression techniques to include both fixed effects, which are constant across subjects, and
random effects, which vary between subjects. Compared with standard linear models, mixed effects models allow
for differentiation between effects that are subject-specific and those that persist across an entire population. Here,
all models were fit using the fitlme function in MATLAB (R2018a), and random effects were chosen as the max-
imal structure that (i) allowed model convergence and (ii) did not include effects whose 95% confidence intervals
overlapped with zero.70 In what follows, when referring to our mixed effects models, we employ the standard R
notation.71
First, we considered the cross-cluster surprisal effect (Fig. 2a). Since we were only interested in measur-
ing higher-order effects of the network topology on human reaction times, it was important to regress out simple
biomechanical dependencies on the target button combinations (Fig. 17d) and the natural quickening of reactions
with time (Fig. 17e). Also, since some subjects responded to both the modular and lattice graphs (see Experi-
mental Procedures), it was important to account for changes in reaction times due to which stage of the experi-
ment a subject was in. To measure the cross-cluster surprisal effect, we fit a mixed effects model with the formula
‘RT ∼ log(Trial)∗Stage+Target+Trans Type+(1+log(Trial)∗Stage+Trans Type | ID)’, whereRT is the
reaction time, Trial is the trial number between 501 and 1500 (we found that log(Trial) was far more predictive of
subjects’ reaction times than the trial number itself), Stage is the stage of the experiment (either one or two), Target
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is the target button combination, Trans Type is the type of transition (either within-cluster or between-cluster), and
ID is each subject’s unique ID. Learning this mixed effects model (Supplementary Tab. 1), we found a fixed 50 ms
increase in reaction times (p < 0.001) for between-cluster transitions relative to within-cluster transitions (Fig. 2a).
This increase indicates that the subjects had systematically stronger expectations for within-cluster transitions than for
between-cluster transitions. Before proceeding, we note that because reaction times are not Gaussian distributed, it is
fairly standard to perform a log transformation. However, for the above result as well as those that follow, we find the
same qualitative effects with or without a log transformation.
We next studied the modular-lattice effect (Fig. 2b). To do so, we fit a mixed effects model with the formula
‘RT ∼ log(Trial) ∗Stage+Target+Graph+ (1 + log(Trial) ∗Stage+Graph | ID)’, where Graph represents
the type of transition network, either modular or lattice. Learning this mixed effects model (Supplementary Tab. 2),
we found a fixed 31 ms increase in reaction times (p < 0.001) in the lattice graph relative to the modular graph (Fig.
2b). This increase indicates that subjects had systematically stronger expectations overall for transitions in the modular
graph than in the lattice graph, again suggesting that densely-connected communities conserve probability weight in
mental estimates of transition structures.
Finally, we considered the effects of violations of varying topological distance in the ring lattice (Fig. 6c). We
fit a mixed effects model with the formula ‘RT ∼ log(Trial) +Target+Recency+Top Dist+ (1 + log(Trial) +
Recency+Top Dist | ID)’, whereRecency represents the number of trials since last observing a node and Top Dist
represents the topological distance of a transition, either one for a standard transition, two for a short violation, or
three for a long violation. We included Recency in the model to ensure that any dependence on topological distance
was purely due to internal expectations about the transition structure and not merely the result of recency effects.63
Learning the model (Supplementary Tabs. 7 and 8), we found a 38 ms increase in reaction times for short violations
relative to standard transitions (p < 0.001), a 63 ms increase in reaction times for long violations relative to standard
transitions (p < 0.001), and a 28 ms increase in reaction times for long violations relative to short violations (p =
0.011). Together, these results indicate that, even after accounting for recency effects, people’s expectations of network
violations decrease with increasing topological distance. Put simply, people are more surprised by violations to the
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network structure that take them further from their current position in the network, suggesting that people have an
implicit understanding of the topological distances between nodes in the network.
Experimental setup for n-back memory task. Subjects performed a series of n-back memory tasks using a computer
screen and keyboard. Each subject observed a random sequence of the letters ‘B’, ’D’, ’G’, ’T’, and ’V’, wherein each
letter was randomly displayed in either upper or lower case. The subjects responded on each trial using the keyboard
to indicate whether or not the current letter was the same as the letter that occurred n trials previously. For each
subject, this task was repeated for the conditions n = 1, 2, and 3, and each condition consisted of a sequence of 100
letters. The three conditions were presented in a random order to each subject. After the n-back task, each subject
then performed a serial response task (as described above) consisting of 1500 trials drawn from the modular graph.
Data analysis for n-back memory task. In order to estimate the inverse temperature β for each subject from their
n-back data, we directly measured their memory distribution P (∆t). As described in the main text, we treated each
positive response indicating that the current stimulus matched the target stimulus as a sample of P (∆t) by measuring
the distance in trials ∆t between the last instance of the current stimulus and the target (Fig. 5a). For each subject,
we combined all such samples across the three conditions n = 1, 2, and 3 to arrive at a histogram for ∆t. In order
to generate robust estimates for the inverse temperature β, we generated 1000 bootstrap samples of the ∆t histogram
for each subject. For each sample, we calculated a linear fit to the distribution P (∆t) on log-linear axes within the
domain 0 ≤ ∆t ≤ 4 (note that we could not carry the fit out to ∆t = 10 because the data is much sparser for
individual subjects). To ensure that the logarithm of P (∆t) was well defined for each sample – that is, to ensure that
P (∆t) > 0 for all ∆t – we added one count to each value of ∆t. We then estimated the inverse temperature β for
each sample by calculating the negative slope of the linear fit of logP (∆t) versus ∆t. To arrive at an average estimate
of β for each subject, we averaged β across the 1000 bootstrap samples. Finally, we compared these estimates of β
from the n-back experiment with estimates of β from subjects’ reaction times in the subsequent serial response task,
as described above. We found that these two independent estimates of people’s inverse temperatures are significantly
correlated (excluding subjects for which β = 0 or β →∞), with a Spearman coefficient rs = 0.28 (p = 0.047).
Experimental procedures. All participants provided informed consent in writing and experimental methods were
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approved by the Institutional Review Board of the University of Pennsylvania. In total, we recruited 604 unique
participants to complete our studies on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. For the first serial response experiment, 101
participants only responded to sequences drawn from the modular graph, 113 participants only responded to sequences
drawn from the lattice graph, and 72 participants responded to sequences drawn from both the modular and lattice
graphs in back-to-back (counter-balanced) sessions for a total of 173 exposures to the modular graph and 185 exposures
to the lattice graph. For the second serial response experiment, we recruited 78 participants to respond to sequences
drawn from the ring graph with violations randomly interspersed. For the n-back experiment, 150 subjects performed
the n-back task and, of those, 88 completed the subsequent serial response task. Finally, we recruited 90 subjects to
perform our Hamiltonian walk experiment, as described in the Supplementary Information. Worker IDs were used to
exclude duplicate participants between experiments, and all participants were financially remunerated for their time.
In the first experiment, subjects were paid up to $11 for up to an estimated 60 minutes: $3 per network for up to
two networks, $2 per network for correctly responding on at least 90% of the trials, and $1 for completing the entire
task. In the second experiment, subjects were paid up to $7.50 for an estimated 30 minutes: $5.50 for completing the
experiment and $2 for correctly responding on at least 90% of the trials. In the n-back experiment, subjects were paid
up to $8.50 for an estimated 45 minutes: $7 for completing the entire experiment and $1.50 for correctly responding
on at least 90% of the serial response trials.
At the beginning of each experiment, subjects were provided with the following instructions: “In a few minutes,
you will see five squares shown on the screen, which will light up as the experiment progresses. These squares
correspond with keys on your keyboard, and your job is to watch the squares and press the corresponding key when
that square lights up.” For the 72 subjects that responded to both the modular and lattice graphs, an additional piece
of information was also provided: “This part will take around 30 minutes, followed by a similar task which will take
another 30 minutes.” Before each experiment began, subjects were given a short quiz to verify that they had read
and understood the instructions. If any questions were answered incorrectly, subjects were shown the instructions
again and asked to repeat the quiz until they answered all questions correctly. Next, all subjects were shown a 10-trial
segment that did not count towards their performance; this segment also displayed text on the screen explicitly telling
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the subject what keys to press on their keyboard. Subjects then began their 1500-trial experiment. For the subjects that
responded to both the modular and lattice graphs, a brief reminder was presented before the second graph, but no new
instructions were given. After completing each experiment, subjects were presented with performance information
and their bonus earned, as well as the option to provide feedback.
Data Availability
The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon
request.
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Structure from noise: Mental errors yield abstract representations of events
Supplementary Information
In this Supplementary Information, we provide extended discussion and data to support the
results presented in the main text. The content is organized to roughly mirror the organization of
the paper:
1. We begin by presenting experimental evidence showing that human reaction times – in addi-
tion to depending on higher-order network features – also reflect differences in the fine-scale
structure at the level of individual nodes. Just as for the higher-order effects presented in the
main text, we demonstrate that these fine-scale phenomena are accurately predicted by our
maximum entropy model.
2. To facilitate the reproducibility of our main results, we present the mixed effects models that
were used to measure the cross-cluster surprisal and modular-lattice effects.
3. To establish that these higher-order effects cannot simply be explained by recency, we present
a new experiment that includes trials from Hamiltonian walks.
4. We show that the probability of an error on the the serial response tasks increases for
between- versus within-cluster transitions in the modular graph, indicating that our frame-
work can be used to predict more than just human reaction times.
5. We present the mixed effects models that were used to measure the effects of violations in
the ring graph.
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6. We show that the cross-cluster surprisal and modular-lattice effects persist even if we con-
sider all 1500 trials for each subject, suggesting that our main experimental results are robust
to the particulars of our data processing.
7. We provide a simple and intuitive argument that the forgetting of past stimuli altogether
cannot explain the higher-order network effects that we examine in the main text.
8. To aid in the reconstruction of our gradient descent algorithm for estimating the inverse
temperature β from subjects’ reaction times, we derive an analytic form for the gradient of
the RMS prediction error of our model with respect to β.
9. Finally, we highlight the relation between our model and the successor representation in re-
inforcement learning, describing both mathematical similarities and conceptual differences.
1 The effects of node heterogeneity on human expectations
In the main text, we demonstrated that human expectations depend critically on the higher-order
network structure of transitions. In addition to these higher-order phenomena, it has long been
known that human expectations also reflect differences in the fine-scale structure of transition
networks.6, 24 For instance, humans are surprised by rare transitions, represented in a transition
network by edges with low probability weight.4 Here, we provide empirical evidence showing that
people’s expectations also depend on the local topologies of the nodes that bookend a transition,
and that these fine-scale effects are consistently predicted by our maximum entropy model.
In order to clearly study the effects of higher-order network structure, in the main text we
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focused on networks with uniform edge weights and node degrees. Here, to study the effects of
node heterogeneity, we instead consider a set of Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graphs with the same number
of nodes (N = 15) and edges (30) as in our previous modular and lattice graphs. To ensure that
the random walks are properly defined, we set the transition probability Aij of each edge in the
graph to 1/di, where di is the degree of node i. Since the probabilitiesAij decrease as the degree di
increases, one should suspect that high-degree (or hub) nodes yield decreased anticipations – and
therefore increased reaction times – at the next step of a random sequence. Indeed, using Eq. (6)
from the main text, we find that our model analytically predicts decreased expectations following
a high-degree node (Supplementary Fig. 7a). Furthermore, across 177 human subjects, we find a
strong positive correlation between people’s reaction times and the degree of the preceding node
in the sequence (Supplementary Fig. 7b).
Interestingly, while people’s anticipations exhibit a sharp decline if the preceding node has
high-degree, our model predicts that these hub nodes instead yield increased anticipations on the
current step (Supplementary Fig. 7c). Thus, while hub nodes give rise to marked increases in
reaction times on the subsequent step, these high-degree nodes actually yield faster reactions on
the current step24 (Supplementary Fig. 7d). This juxtaposition of effects from one time step to
the next highlights the complex ways in which the network structure of transitions can affect peo-
ple’s mental representations. Additionally, the success of our model in predicting these competing
phenomena further strengthens our conclusion that mental errors play a crucial role in shaping
people’s internal expectations.
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Supplementary Fig. 1: The effects of node degree on reaction times.
a, The average expectation Aˆij plotted with respect to the degree of the preceding node i
across a range of inverse temperatures β. As expected, expectations decrease as the degree
of the preceding node increases; and for β = 10, we have Aˆij ≈ Aij = 1/di. The lines
and shaded regions represent averages and 95% confidence intervals over 1000 randomly-
generated Erdo¨s-Re´nyi networks. b, People exhibit sharp increases in reaction time following
nodes of higher degree, with Spearman’s correlation rS = 0.23. The data is combined across
177 subjects, each of whom was asked to respond to a sequence of 1500 stimuli drawn from
a random Erdo¨s-Re´nyi network. Each data point represents the average reaction time for
one node of a graph, and so each subject contributes 15 points. The line and shaded region
represent the best fit and 95% confidence interval, respectively. c, The average expectation
Aˆij plotted with respect to the degree of the current node j across the same range of inverse
temperatures as in a. d, People exhibit a steady decline in reaction times as the current node
degree increases, with Spearman’s correlation rS = −0.10.
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2 Measuring higher-order network effects
In order to extract the effects of higher-order network structure on subjects’ reaction times, we
use linear mixed effects models, which have become prominent in human research where many
measurements are made for each subject.40, 69 To fit our mixed effects models and to estimate the
statistical significance of each effect we use the fitlme function in MATLAB (R2018a). In what
follows, when referring to our mixed effects models, we adopt the standard R notation.71
Cross-cluster surprisal effect. We first measure the cross-cluster surprisal effect (Fig. 2a) using
a mixed effects model with the formula ‘RT ∼ log(Trial) ∗ Stage + Target + Trans Type +
(1 + log(Trial) ∗ Stage + Trans Type | ID)’, where RT is the reaction time, Trial is the trial
number between 501 and 1500, Stage is the stage of the experiment (either one or two), Target
is the target button combination, Trans Type is the type of transition (either within-cluster or
between-cluster), and ID is each subject’s unique ID. This mixed effects model is summarized in
Supplementary Tab. 1, reporting a 50 ms increase in reaction times for between-cluster transitions
relative to within-cluster transitions (Fig. 2a).
Modular-lattice effect. We next measure the modular-lattice effect (Fig. 2b) using a mixed effects
model of the form ‘RT ∼ log(Trial) ∗ Stage + Target + Graph + (1 + log(Trial) ∗ Stage +
Graph | ID)’, where Graph represents the type of transition network, either modular or lattice.
This mixed effects model is summarized in Supplementary Tab. 2, reporting a 31 ms increase in
reaction times in the lattice graph relative to the modular graph (Fig. 2b).
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Effect Estimate (ms) t-value Pr(>|t|) Significance
(Intercept) 1528.3± 78.1 19.56 < 0.001 ∗ ∗ ∗
log(Trial) −101.3± 9.6 −10.50 < 0.001 ∗ ∗ ∗
Stage −708.2± 95.0 −7.45 < 0.001 ∗ ∗ ∗
Trans Type 49.7± 6.3 7.94 < 0.001 ∗ ∗ ∗
log(Trial):Stage 78.9± 11.9 6.63 < 0.001 ∗ ∗ ∗
Supplementary Tab. 1: Mixed effects model measuring the cross-cluster surprisal ef-
fect. A mixed effects model fit to the reaction time data for the modular graph with the goal of
measuring the cross-cluster surprisal effect. We find a significant 50 ms increase in reaction
times for between-cluster transitions versus within-cluster transitions (grey). The significance
column represents p-values less than 0.001 (∗ ∗ ∗), less than 0.01 (∗∗), and less than 0.05 (∗).
Effect Estimate (ms) t-value Pr(>|t|) Significance
(Intercept) 1467.3± 49.0 29.96 < 0.001 ∗ ∗ ∗
log(Trial) −98.4± 6.2 −15.96 < 0.001 ∗ ∗ ∗
Stage −588.3± 60.4 −9.74 < 0.001 ∗ ∗ ∗
Graph 31.4± 5.9 5.36 < 0.001 ∗ ∗ ∗
log(Trial):Stage 75.3± 8.5 8.83 < 0.001 ∗ ∗ ∗
Supplementary Tab. 2: Mixed effects model measuring the modular-lattice effect. A
mixed effects model fit to the reaction time data for the modular and lattice graphs with the
goal of measuring the modular-lattice effect. We find a significant 31 ms increase in reaction
times overall in the lattice graph relative to the modular graph (grey). The significance column
represents p-values less than 0.001 (∗ ∗ ∗), less than 0.01 (∗∗), and less than 0.05 (∗).
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3 Controlling for recency: Cross cluster surprisal in Hamiltonian walks
Throughout the main text, we assume that people’s reaction times reflect their internal represen-
tations of the transition structure. To justify this assumption, we must show that the higher-order
network effects cannot simply be explained by recency. To control for recency effects, we employ
the concept of a Hamiltonian walk, which is a walk through the transition graph that visits each
node exactly once. We run a new experiment in which each subject is presented with a sequence of
1500 stimuli drawn from the modular graph: The first 700 nodes reflect a standard random walk,
while the remaining 800 trials consist of 8 repeated segments of 85 stimuli specified by a random
walk followed by 15 stimuli specified by a Hamiltonian walk. The initial 700 random walk trials
are meant to constitute a learning phase in which the subject builds an internal representation of the
modular graph. Since, in the modular graph, Hamiltonian walks do not obey the same transition
probabilities as random walks, the sequences of 85 random walk trials between each Hamiltonian
sequence are meant to help the subject maintain their learned representation. Within the set of
Hamiltonian walks through the modular graph, the probability of transitioning from one cluster
boundary node to the adjacent one (if not already visited) is 1, whereas the probability of tran-
sitioning from the latter boundary node to each of the adjacent non-boundary nodes is 1/3. To
eliminate this difference, we randomly selected one fixed Hamiltonian walk for each subject. This
fixed walk was entered at a different node depending on where the preceding walk terminated, and
we randomly switched between forward and backward traversals for each walk.22
We measure the cross-cluster surprisal within the Hamiltonian trials using a mixed effects
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Effect Estimate (ms) t-value Pr(>|t|) Significance
(Intercept) 1601.7± 207.8 7.71 < 0.001 ∗ ∗ ∗
log(Trial) −124.7± 28.4 −4.38 < 0.001 ∗ ∗ ∗
Trans Type 25.1± 9.4 2.68 0.007 ∗∗
Supplementary Tab. 3: Mixed effects model measuring the cross-cluster surprisal ef-
fect in Hamiltonian walks. A mixed effects model fit to subjects’ reaction times in Hamiltonian
walks on the modular graph with the goal of measuring the cross-cluster surprisal effect. We
find a significant 25 ms increase in reaction times for between-cluster transitions versus within-
cluster transitions (grey). The significance column represents p-values less than 0.001 (∗ ∗ ∗),
less than 0.01 (∗∗), and less than 0.05 (∗).
model with the formula ‘RT ∼ log(Trial)+Target+Trans Type+(1+log(Trial)|ID)’, where
each of the variables has been defined previously. Note that we have removed the mixed effect on
the Trans Type variable because, when it was included, its estimate overlapped significantly with
zero. The model is summarized in Supplementary Tab. 3, reporting a 25 ms increase in reaction
times for between-cluster transitions relative to within-cluster transitions within Hamiltonian trials
(p = 0.007). This result demonstrates conclusively that the cross-cluster surprisal effect cannot
be explained by recency alone, and must therefore must be at least partially driven by people’s
internal representations of the transition structure.
As discussed above, the first 700 trials of each sequence were drawn from a random walk
to allow subjects to build an internal representation of the transition structure. Since the transition
probabilities reflected in the Hamiltonian walks differ from those in the random walks, we then
expect subjects’ representations to shift as they observe Hamiltonian trials. Therefore, to further
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Effect Estimate (ms) t-value Pr(>|t|) Significance
(Intercept) 1466.8± 217.5 6.74 < 0.001 ∗ ∗ ∗
log(Trial) −105.5± 29.9 −3.53 < 0.001 ∗ ∗ ∗
Trans Type 691.56± 318.23 2.17 0.030 ∗
log(Trial):Trans Type −94.9± 45.3 −2.10 0.036 ∗
Supplementary Tab. 4: Mixed effects model measuring the decrease in cross-cluster
surprisal with increasing Hamiltonian trials. A mixed effects model fit to subjects’ reaction
times in Hamiltonian walks on the modular graph with the goal of measuring the dependence
of the cross-cluster surprisal on increasing Hamiltonian trials. We find a significant decrease
in the strength of the cross-cluster surprisal with increasing Hamiltonian trials (grey). The
significance column represents p-values less than 0.001 (∗ ∗ ∗), less than 0.01 (∗∗), and less
than 0.05 (∗).
establish the notion that people’s reactions are primarily driven by their internal representations,
here we show that the strength of the cross-cluster surprisal decreases as subjects observe increas-
ing numbers of Hamiltonian trials. To do so, we use a mixed effects model with the formula
‘RT ∼ log(Trial) ∗ Trans Type + Target + (1 + log(Trial)|ID)’, where the only differ-
ence with the formula above is that here we include an interaction term between log(Trial) and
Trans Type. The results of the fitted model are summarized in Supplementary Tab. 4, reporting a
significant decrease in the strength of the cross-cluster surprisal with increasing Hamiltonian trials
(p = 0.036).
Experimental setup and procedures. Subjects performed a self-paced serial reaction time task,
as described in the Methods section of the main text. The only difference between this experiment
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and that described previously is that the 1500 trials were split into 700 trials drawn as a random
walk and a subsequent 800 trials divided into 8 segments of 85 random walk trials followed by 15
Hamiltonian walk trials, all drawn from the modular graph. In total, we recruited 90 subjects to
perform this Hamiltonian walk experiment, and they were paid up to $5 each for an estimated 30
minutes: $3.50 for completing the task and $1.50 for correctly responding on at least 90% of the
trials.
4 Network effects on error trials
Thus far we have focused on predicting human reaction times as a proxy for people’s anticipations
of transitions. Another way to probe anticipation is by studying the trials on which subjects respond
incorrectly; one might expect that the probability of an erroneous response should increase with
decreasing anticipation. Here, we test this hypothesis for between- versus within-cluster transitions
in the modular graph and for all transitions in the modular graph versus the lattice graph.
Cross-cluster surprisal effect on errors. First, we consider the cross-cluster surprisal effect on
errors defined by an increase in task errors for transitions between clusters relative to transitions
within clusters in the modular graph. We employ a mixed effects model with formula ‘Error ∼
log(Trial) + Stage + Target + TransType + (1 + log(Trial) + Stage + TransType|ID)’,
where Error indicates whether the subject provided an incorrect (‘1’) or correct (’0’) response,
Trial is the trial number between 501 and 1500, Stage is the stage of the experiment (either one
or two), Target is the target button combination, Trans Type is the type of transition (either
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Effect Estimate t-value Pr(>|t|) Significance
(Intercept) 0.010± 0.011 0.86 0.390
log(Trial) 0.004± 0.002 2.11 0.035 ∗
Stage 0.011± 0.007 1.59 0.112
Trans Type 0.008± 0.002 3.32 < 0.001 ∗ ∗ ∗
Supplementary Tab. 5: Mixed effects model measuring the cross-cluster effect on task
errors. A mixed effects model fit to predict error trials for the modular graph with the goal of
measuring the cross-cluster effect on task errors. We find a significant increase in task errors
for between-cluster transitions relative to within-cluster transitions (grey). The significance
column represents p-values less than 0.001 (∗ ∗ ∗), less than 0.01 (∗∗), and less than 0.05 (∗).
within-cluster or between-cluster), and ID is each subject’s unique ID. Note that, relative to our
measurement of the cross-cluster surprisal for reaction times, we have removed the interaction
between log(Trial) and Stage because it was not statistically significant in this setting. We find
a significant increase in errors for between- versus within-cluster transitions (Supplementary Tab.
5), suggesting yet again that subjects have weaker anticipation for cross-cluster transitions than for
within-cluster transitions.
Modular-lattice effect on errors. Second, we consider the modular-lattice effect on errors defined
by an increase in task errors for the lattice graph relative to the modular graph. We employ a
mixed effects model with formula ‘Error ∼ log(Trial) + Stage + Target + Graph + (1 +
log(Trial) + Stage + Graph|ID)’, where each of the variables has been defined previously. We
again note that we have removed the interaction between log(Trial) and Stage because it was
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Effect Estimate t-value Pr(>|t|) Significance
(Intercept) 0.031± 0.009 3.58 < 0.001 ∗ ∗ ∗
log(Trial) 0.002± 0.001 1.42 0.156
Stage 0.001± 0.002 0.33 0.739
Graph 0.001± 0.002 0.11 0.916
Supplementary Tab. 6: Mixed effects model measuring the modular-lattice effect on
task errors. A mixed effects model fit to predict error trials for the modular and lattice graphs
with the goal of measuring the modular-lattice effect on task errors. We do not find a significant
increase in errors for either graph (grey). The significance column represents p-values less
than 0.001 (∗ ∗ ∗), less than 0.01 (∗∗), and less than 0.05 (∗).
not statistically significant in our prediction of task errors. Inspecting the mixed effects model
described in Supplementary Tab. 6, we do not find a significant difference in the number of task
errors between the modular and lattice graphs. One possible explanation for this lack of an effect
is that people’s task accuracy is predominantly impacted by very poorly anticipated transitions.
Thus, while anticipation in the lattice graph is lower than that in the modular graph on average,
it could be the case that the significant decrease in anticipation for cross-cluster transitions in the
modular graph yields a similar number of task errors overall.
5 Measuring the effects of network violations.
We study the effects of violations of varying topological distance in the ring graph using a mixed
effects model with the formula ‘RT ∼ log(Trial) + Target + Recency + Top Dist + (1 +
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Effect Estimate (ms) t-value Pr(>|t|) Significance
(Intercept) 1352.7± 79.2 17.07 < 0.001 ∗ ∗ ∗
log(Trial) −101.1± 10.2 −9.96 < 0.001 ∗ ∗ ∗
Recency 2.1± 0.1 16.20 < 0.001 ∗ ∗ ∗
Top Dist (short vs. no violation) 37.9± 8.4 4.50 < 0.001 ∗ ∗ ∗
Top Dist (long vs. no violation) 63.3± 7.8 8.07 < 0.001 ∗ ∗ ∗
Supplementary Tab. 7: Mixed effects model measuring the effects of violations relative
to standard transitions. A mixed effects model fit to the reaction time data for the ring graph
with the goal of measuring the effects of violations relative to standard transitions. We find a
significant increase in reaction times of 38 ms for short violations and 63 ms for long violations
(grey), even after accounting for recency effects. The significance column represents p-values
less than 0.001 (∗ ∗ ∗), less than 0.01 (∗∗), and less than 0.05 (∗).
log(Trial) + Recency + Top Dist | ID)’, where Recency represents the number of trials since
last observing a node63 and Top Dist represents the topological distance of a transition, either one
for a standard transition, two for a short violation, or three for a long violation. The results of fitting
this mixed effects model are summarized in Supplementary Tab. 7, reporting increases in reaction
times over standard transitions of 38 ms for short violations and 63 ms for long violations. Second,
to measure the difference in reaction times between long and short violations, we implemented a
model of the same form, but restricted Top Dist to only include short violations of topological
distance two and long violations of topological distances three and four. This model is summarized
in Supplementary Tab. 8, reporting a 28 ms increase in reaction times for long violations relative
to short violations.
47
Effect Estimate (ms) t-value Pr(>|t|) Significance
(Intercept) 1380.9± 156.1 8.84 < 0.001 ∗ ∗ ∗
log(Trial) −97.1± 21.3 −4.57 < 0.001 ∗ ∗ ∗
Recency 0.7± 0.3 2.67 0.008 ∗∗
Top Dist (long vs. short violation) 28.4± 11.2 2.54 0.011 ∗
Supplementary Tab. 8: Mixed effects model measuring the effects of long versus short
violations. A mixed effects model fit to the reaction time data for the ring graph with the goal
of measuring the effects of long versus short violations. We find a significant 28 ms increase
in reaction times for long violations relative to short violations (grey), even after accounting for
recency effects. The significance column represents p-values less than 0.001 (∗∗∗), less than
0.01 (∗∗), and less than 0.05 (∗).
6 Measuring network effects including early trials
Throughout the above analysis of the serial response tasks, we purposefully omitted the first 500
trials for each subject, choosing instead to focus on the final 1000 trials. We did this in order
to allow the subjects to build an internal representation of each network structure before probing
their anticipations of transitions. Here, we show that this data processing step is not necessary to
observe higher-order network effects; that is, we show that there exist significant network effects
even if we include the first 500 trials in our analysis.
Cross-cluster surprisal effect. We first consider the cross-cluster surprisal effect defined by an
increase in reaction times for transitions between clusters relative to transitions within clusters in
the modular graph. Using a mixed effects model of the same form as that used in the previous
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Effect Estimate (ms) t-value Pr(>|t|) Significance
(Intercept) 1427.0± 47.9 29.81 < 0.001 ∗ ∗ ∗
log(Trial) −88.4± 5.1 −17.34 < 0.001 ∗ ∗ ∗
Stage −643.7± 57.0 −11.29 < 0.001 ∗ ∗ ∗
Trans Type 51.9± 6.2 8.41 < 0.001 ∗ ∗ ∗
log(Trial):Stage 69.1± 12.1 12.07 < 0.001 ∗ ∗ ∗
Supplementary Tab. 9: Mixed effects model measuring the cross-cluster surprisal ef-
fect including the first 500 trials. A mixed effects model fit to all of the reaction time data,
including the first 500 trials for each subject, for the modular graph with the goal of measuring
the cross-cluster surprisal effect. We find a significant 52 ms increase in reaction times for
between-cluster transitions versus within-cluster transitions. The significance column repre-
sents p-values less than 0.001 (∗ ∗ ∗), less than 0.01 (∗∗), and less than 0.05 (∗).
analysis (i.e., ‘RT ∼ log(Trial) ∗ Stage+ Target+ Trans Type+ (1 + log(Trial) ∗ Stage+
Trans Type | ID)’), and including all 1500 trials for each subject, we find a significant 52 ms
increase in reaction times for between- versus within-cluster transitions (Supplementary Tab. 9).
We note that this effect is even larger than that observed in our previous analysis (Supplementary
Tab. 1).
Modular-lattice effect. We next consider the modular-lattice effect defined by an increase in
reaction times in the lattice graph relative to the modular graph. Using a mixed effects model of
the same form as that used in the previous analysis (i.e., ‘RT ∼ log(Trial) ∗ Stage + Target +
Graph+ (1 + log(Trial) ∗ Stage+Graph | ID)’), and including all 1500 trials for each subject,
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Effect Estimate (ms) t-value Pr(>|t|) Significance
(Intercept) 1377.6± 30.6 45.07 < 0.001 ∗ ∗ ∗
log(Trial) −87.3± 3.4 −25.82 < 0.001 ∗ ∗ ∗
Stage −511.1± 25.6 −19.94 < 0.001 ∗ ∗ ∗
Graph 27.2± 5.8 4.69 < 0.001 ∗ ∗ ∗
log(Trial):Stage 64.4± 3.6 18.15 < 0.001 ∗ ∗ ∗
Supplementary Tab. 10: Mixed effects model measuring the modular-lattice effect in-
cluding the first 500 trials. A mixed effects model fit to all of the reaction time data, including
the first 500 trials for each subject, for the modular and lattice graphs with the goal of measur-
ing the modular-lattice effect. We find a significant 27 ms increase in reaction times overall in
the lattice graph relative to the modular graph. The significance column represents p-values
less than 0.001 (∗ ∗ ∗), less than 0.01 (∗∗), and less than 0.05 (∗).
we find a significant 27 ms increase in reaction times in the lattice versus the modular graph
(Supplementary Tab. 10). These results demonstrate that higher-order network effects studied in
the main text exist throughout the entire serial response task.
7 The simple forgetting of stimuli cannot explain network effects
In the derivation of our model, the central mathematical object is the memory distribution P (∆t),
which represents the probability that a person recalls the stimulus that occurred at time t − ∆t
instead of the stimulus that they were trying to recall at time t. Generally, this memory distribution
is intended to reflect the erroneous shuffling of past stimuli in a person’s memory. Alternatively,
one could imagine errors in memory that reflect the forgetting of past stimuli altogether, a process
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that has recently been shown to impact human reinforcement learning55, 56 and to facilitate flexible
and generalizable decision making47. Here we argue that this second form of cognitive errors –
that is, the simple forgetting of stimuli – cannot explain the higher-order network effects described
in the main text.
Consider a sequence of stimuli reflecting a random walk of length T on a network defined
by the transition matrix A, where Aij represents the probability of transitioning from stimulus i to
stimulus j. Given a running tally nij(T ) of the number of times each transition has occurred, we
recall that the most accurate prediction for the transition structure is given by the maximum like-
lihood estimate AˆMLEij (T ) = nij(T )/
∑
k nik(T ). Now suppose that a human learner forgets each
observed transition at some fixed rate. On average, this process of estimating A after forgetting
some number of transitions uniformly at random is equivalent to estimating A at some prior time
Teff. In other words, forgetting observed transitions at random simply introduces additional white
noise into the transitions estimates AˆMLEij (T ). As discussed in the main text, maximum likelihood
estimation provides an unbiased estimate of the transition structure, and therefore cannot explain
the fact that people’s representations depend systematically on higher-order network organization.
Similarly, the addition of white noise to AˆMLE(T ) will also yield an unbiased (although less accu-
rate) estimate of the transition structure. Therefore, while the forgetting of past stimuli certainly
plays an important role in a number of cognitive processes47, 55, 56, this mechanism cannot be used
to explain the higher-order network effects observed in human experiments and predicted by our
model.
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8 Gradient of RMS error with respect to inverse temperature β
Given a sequence of nodes xt, we recall that our prediction for the reaction time at time t is given
by rˆ(t) = r0 + r1a(t), where a(t) = Aˆxt−1,xt(t − 1) is the predicted anticipation of node xt. The
gradient of the RMS error RMSE =
√∑
t(r(t)− rˆ(t))2 with respect to the inverse temperature β
is given by
∂RMSE
∂β
=
r1
RMSE
∑
t
(r(t)− rˆ(t)) ∂a(t)
∂β
, (12)
where the derivative of the anticipation is given by
∂Aˆij(t)
∂β
=
1∑
k n˜ik(t)
(
∂n˜ij(t)
∂β
− Aˆij
∑
`
∂n˜i`(t)
∂β
)
. (13)
Recalling Eq. (8) from the main text, the derivative of the transition counts can be written
∂n˜ij(t)
∂β
=
t−1∑
t′=1
t′−1∑
∆t=0
∂Pt′(∆t)
∂β
[i = xt′−∆t] [j = xt′+1] , (14)
where Pt′(∆t) represents the probability of accidentally remembering the node xt′−∆t instead of
the target node xt′ . Taking one more derivative, we have
∂Pt′(∆t)
∂β
= Pt′(∆t)
(
−∆t+
t′−1∑
∆t′=0
Pt′(∆t
′)∆t′
)
. (15)
Taken together, Eqs. (12)-(15) define the derivative of the RMS error with respect to the inverse
temperature β, thus completing the description of our gradient descent algorithm.
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9 Connection to the successor representation
In the limit of an infinitely-long sequence of nodes, we showed in the main text that the transition
estimates in our model take the following concise analytic form,
Aˆ = (1− e−β)A(I − e−βA)−1, (16)
where A is the true transition structure, β is the inverse temperature in our memory distribution,
and I is the identity matrix. Interestingly, this equation takes a similar form to the successor
representation from reinforcement learning,
M = A(I − γA)−1, (17)
where γ is the future discount factor, which tunes the desired time-scale over which a person
wishes to make predictions.58, 72 Put simply, starting at some node i, the successor representation
Mij counts the future discounted occupancy of node j. Identifying γ = e−β , we notice that
the successor representation is equivalent to an unnormalized version of our transition estimates.
Moreover, the same mathematical form crops up in complex network theory, where it is known as
the communicability between nodes in a graph.19, 67, 68
The relationship between the transition estimates in our model and the successor representa-
tion is fascinating, especially given the marked differences in the concepts that the two models are
based upon. In our model, people attempting to learn the one-step transition structure A instead
arrive at the erroneous estimate Aˆ due to natural errors in perception and recall. By contrast, given
a desired time-scale γ, the successor representation defines the optimal prediction of node occu-
pancies into the future.58, 72 Interestingly, the successor representation has been linked to grid cells
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and abstract representations in the hippocampus,19, 41 decision making in reward-based tasks,42, 73
and the temporal difference and temporal context models of learning and memory.45, 58, 72 Across
all of these contexts, the successor representation implicitly assumes that humans make optimal
predictions about the future; however, our results show that a similar mathematical form can in-
stead represent a person who simply attempts to predict one step into the future, but misses the
mark due to natural errors in cognition. This biologically-plausible hypothesis of erroneous pre-
dictions highlights the importance of thinking carefully about the impact of mental errors on human
learning.47, 55, 56
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